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GIVING VIRGINIA'S ANATOMICAL GIFT
CODE LIFE: CREATING LIABILITY FOR A
HOSPITAL'S FAILURE TO DETERMINE
INDIVIDUAL DONATIVE INTENT
Today, the demand for organs in the United States exceeds
supply.' Each year there are almost twice as many people on
waiting lists for organs as there are available organs.2 The United
States currently relies on altruistically donated anatomical gifts
to procure organs for transplantation. 3 To regulate this voluntary
system, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), 4 which is a
I. See Eric C. Sutton, Giving the Gift of Life: A Survey of Texas Law
Facilitating Organ Donation, 22 ST. MARY's L.J. 959, 960 (1991) (discussing
the number of people on waiting lists for organs); Daniel G. Jardine, Com-
ment, Liability Issues Arising Out of Hospitals' and Organ Procurement
Organizations' Rejection of Valid Anatomical Gifts: The Truth and Conse-
quences, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1655 (1990) (discussing the shortage of transplant
organs); Ann McIntosh, Comment, Regulating the "Gift of Life" - The
1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 65 WASH. L. REv. 171 (1990) (discussing
the shortage of transplant organs).
2. On January 26, 1994, there were 33,586 people waiting for transplant
organs. In 1992, approximately 16,603 people donated organs at the time of
death. Telephone Interview with Donna Johnston, Office Assistant, United
Network of Organ Sharing (Feb. 3, 1994).
3. A.H. Barnett & David L. Kaserman, The Shortage of Organs for
Transplantation: Exploring the Alternatives, 9 IssuEs L. & MED. 117 (1993).
See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing proposed alternatives
to the United States' voluntary organ donation system).
Donated cadaveric organs are also used for research. An organ donor
may specifically donate his or her organs for research purposes. This Note
only discusses organ donation for transplantation purposes. For a detailed
discussion of organ donation for research purposes, see generally Gregory
Gelfand & Toby R. Levin, Fetal Tissue Research: Legal Regulation of Human
Fetal Tissue Transplantation, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 647 (1993); Thomas
P. Dillon, Note, Source Compensation for Tissues and Cells Used in Biotechn-
ical Research: Why a Source Shouldn't Share in the Profits, 64 NoTra DAm
L. REv. 628 (1989); Sigrid Fry, Note, Experimentation on Prisoners' Remains,
24 AM. Cviu. L. REv. 165 (1986); Brian G. Hannemann, Note, Body Parts
and Property Rights: A New Commodity for the 1990s, 22 Sw. U. L. REv.
399 (1993).
4. UNI. ANATOICAL Gr ACT (1987) 8A U.L.A. 19 (1993). Unless
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template for state organ donation laws, suggests donor desig-
nation and procurement procedures. 5 Although most states sub-
stantially follow the UAGA,6 not all provisions are followed in
totality.7 Recent amendments to Virginia Code sections concern-
ing anatomical gifts (VAGA) expand the scope of the UAGA
by changing procedures relating to donor designation and access
to donor information. 8
As amended, the VAGA constitutes an attempt by the Virginia
legislature to strengthen the state's voluntary organ donation
6therwise indicated, UAGA references in this Note refer to the 1987 version
of the UAGA because it contains provisions which are relevant to the proposal
in Part III that were not included in the 1968 version. See infra note 43
(discussing the revision of the 1968 UAGA).
5. Un. ANATOmCAL GIr AcT §§ 2 & 9, 8A U.L.A. 33-34, 58 (1993).
See McIntosh, supra note 1, at 171-74 (discussing the 1968 UAGA and the
1987 UAGA).
6. By 1972, all fifty states adopted the main provisions in the 1968
UAGA. This was the quickest nationwide adoption of a uniform law. See
Jardine, supra note 1, at 1656. See ALA. CODE §§ 22-19-40 to -47 (1969);
ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.50.010 -.090 (1972); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-841
to -849 (1970); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-34-101 to -109 (West 1969);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 27103.4(b)-2719 (1970); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-
1501 to -1511 (1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 732.910-.922 (West 1969); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 44-5-140 to -151 (1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 50/1 to /11
(Smith-Hurd 1969); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 29-2-16-1 to -12 (West 1969); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 142A.1 et seq. (West 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-3209 to -
3218 (1969); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.165-.235 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1970); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:2351 to :2359 (West 1968); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2901-2910 (West 1969); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS
§§ 4-501 to -512 (1968); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 113, §§ 7-14 (West 1971);
MicH. Comnp. LAws ANN. §§ 333.10101-.10109 (West 1969); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 411-39-11, 41-39-31 to -53 (1970); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 194.210-.290 (Vernon
1969); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 71-4801 to -4821 (1971); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 291-A:1 to -A:9 (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:6-57 to -65 (West 1969);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-6-1 to -11 (Michie 1969); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§§ 4300-4308 (McKinney 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-402 to -412.1 (1969);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2108.01-.10 (Anderson 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, §§ 2201-2209 (West 1969); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 97.250-.295 (1969); 20
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8601-8607 (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-43-310 to
-400 (Law. Co-op. 1969); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34-26-20 to -47 (1969);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-30-101 to -111 (1969); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. §§ 692.001-.016 (West 1969); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-19-1 to -9 (1969);
Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-5-101 to -117 (1969).
States were not as quick to adopt the revised 1987 UAGA. McIntosh,
supra note 1, at 176. The most controversial portions of the 1987 UAGA
were the consent provisions and the routine inquiry requirement. Id. For
further discussion see infra part II.A.1. See also infra note 54 (discussing the
1987 UAGA routine inquiry requirement and consent provisions).
7. See Jardine, supra note 1, at 1665 (noting that specific provisions of
the UAGA vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction).
8. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-289 to -297.1 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1994).
See infra part II.B (discussing VAGA and the 1993 amendments).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/6
LIABILITY UNDER ORGAN DONATION LAWS
system.9 The VAGA makes it easier for health care workers to
determine whether an individual intended to donate his or her
organs. In this respect, the 1993 VAGA amendments comport
with the UAGA goal of increasing organ donation. This Note,
however, questions whether the recent VAGA amendments suf-
ficiently advance the UAGA goal of increasing organ donation.
Concluding that, as amended, the VAGA does not go far enough
in achieving increased organ donations, this Note proposes fur-
ther changes to the VAGA. 10 The proposed changes would
increase the supply of organs for transplantation by improving
hospital access to donor information and encouraging hospitals
to discover donors' intent. Finally, this Note suggests that states
adopting the 1987 UAGA consider adopting provisions similar
to the VAGA provisions as amended by this Note.
Part I of this Note examines the cause of the organ donor
shortage and legislative attempts to increase organ supply. Part
II analyzes relevant UAGA provisions and the VAGA amend-
ments. Part III proposes VAGA amendments that would increase
the number of available organs by allowing hospitals to access
donor information and by creating potential hospital liability
for failure to verify donor status. Part IV addresses some policy
concerns that this Note's proposed amendments may raise.
I. THE ORGAN SHORTAGE
Factors contributing to the significant dearth of organs avail-
able for transplantation range from advances in medical tech-
nology, which increases the feasibility of organ transplantation,"
to human inability to fully accept the recycling of organs. State
and federal governments enacted legislation that promotes organ
donation for transplantation.' 2 Given the ever growing demand
for organs, however, states cannot view the UAGA's donation
guidelines as the most they can do to encourage organ donation.
State legislatures can better achieve the UAGA's goal of increas-
ing voluntary organ donations by expanding the UAGA.
A. The Extent of the Organ Shortage
Organ transplantation became medically possible less than
thirty-five years ago.' 3 Today, a patient may, in some cases,
9. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
10. The Virginia legislature provided no written legislative history for the
VAGA. According to the prefatory note of the 1987 UAGA, however, the
purpose of provisions regulating anatomical gifts is to encourage the voluntary
donation of organs. UNrP. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT Prefatory Note (1987), 8A
U.L.A. 20 (1993).
11. McIntosh, supra note 1, at 171 n.2.
12. See infra notes 33-36 and 41-43 and accompanying text.
13. Dr. David Hume performed the first organ transplant in 1951. Devel-
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have a ninety percent chance of surviving for at least two years
after an organ transplant.14 Orgai procurement, however, is an
area of controversy in spite of the medical feasibility and success
of transplantation. 5 The controversy surrounding the procure-
ment of organs is exacerbated by the shortage of organs available
for transplantation.
Despite public support for organ donations, 16 a burgeoning
demand for transplant organs exists in the United States. Over
the past four years, the number of people awaiting organ
transplants increased from 13,000 to 33,000.'7 Although up to
seven vascular organs can be harvested from a single donor, 8
cadaveric organ donation satisfies only half of the yearly de-
mand. 9 One explanation for the shortage of organs in spite of
opments in the Law - Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARv. L. REv.
1519, 1614 (1990). However, cadaveric organ transplantation did not become
commonplace until the development of cyclosporine, an immunosuppressant
agent. Thomas E. Starzl, Transplantation, 256 JAMA 2110, 2110 (1986).
14. The one-year survival rates after a cadaveric organ transplant are as
follows: kidney, 93%; liver, 73.9%; pancreas, 89.2%; heart, 81.6%; heart-
lung, 55.4%. The two-year survival rates after a cadaveric organ transplant
are as follows: kidney, 90%; liver, 69.4%; pancreas, 84.1%; heart, 77.05o;
heart-lung, 48.8%; lung, 57.70o. Telephone Interview with Donna Johnston,
Office Assistant, United Network of Organ Sharing (Feb. 3, 1994).
15. See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of
the existing organ procurement policy in the United States).
16. Prior to the first draft of the 1968 UAGA, a Gallup poll reported that
7 out of 10 Americans were willing to donate their organs. A 1985 survey
conducted by Gallup concluded that Americans' attitudes about organ donation
remained substantially unchanged. According to the 1985 survey, 27% of those
surveyed indicated that they were "very likely" to donate organs at death.
73% were "very likely" to give permission to donate a loved one's organs,
and 62%o "would not mind" if their organs were donated even if they had
not made a donative gift prior to death. AMERICAN COUNCn. ON TRANSPLAN-
TATIOr, ACTION 7 (1985). See also Dr. John A. Morris, Jr., et al., Pediatric
Organ Donation: The Paradox of Organ Shortage Despite the Remarkable
Willingness of Families to Donate, 89 PEDA mcs 411 (1992); Daphne D.
Sipes, State, Federal Statutes Guide Organ Donation Procedures, HEALTH
PROGRSS, June 1987, at 46, 49.
17. Telephone Interview with Donna Johnston, Office Assistant, United
Network of Organ Sharing (Feb. 3, 1994). See also Fact Sheet published by
the United Network of Organ Sharing (February 2, 1994); NATIONAL KIDNEY
FOUNDATION, KIDNEY (1989) (citing the number of people on waiting lists for
organ transplants as of 1989).
18. A donor can provide two kidneys, two lungs, a heart, a liver, and a
pancreas. Telephone Interview with Dr. Richard L. Hurwitz, Director, Virginia
Vascular Associates (Jan. 13, 1994). See also Jardine, supra note 1, at 1656.
19. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the number of
organs donated each year). Even though only 16,603 organs were donated in
1992, up to 25,000 people who die each year are suitable organ donors. See
Jardine, supra note 1, at 1655 n.1; Jeffrey M. Prottas, The Rules for Asking
and Answering: The Role of Law in Organ Donation, 63 U. DET. L. REV.https://ope scholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/6
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broad public support for organ transplantation is that cadaveric
organs are rarely harvested pursuant to an individually executed
document of gift. 2°
B. The Current Organ Procurement System: Express
Donation
The organ procurement system in the United States relies on
express donation.21 Under this system, individuals may make
voluntary donative gifts only for altruistic purposes. 22 One who
buys or sells organs for "valuable consideration for use in
human transplantation" commits a felony under the National
Organ Transplant Act of 1984.2 The Act also prohibits health
care providers from receiving monetary incentives when they
request that individuals make donative gifts. 24 Thus, under the
current system, organs for transplantation come only from do-
nors who expressly make a gift of their organs.
Critics of express donation cite three main reasons why it is
an inadequate system for procuring organs. First, critics note
183, 183 (1985) (distinguishing between the estimated number of organs
available for transplantation and the number of organs transplanted); Elizabeth
S. Spencer, Maximizing Use of a Scare National Resource: An Analysis of
Alternatives for Establishing Uniform Standards of Conduct for Organ Pro-
curement Agencies, 42 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 430, 431 (1987).
Cadaveric organs are used for most organ transplants. Judith Areen, A
Scarcity of Organs, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 555, 556 (1988). See also Developments
in the Law - Medical Technology and the Law, supra note 13, at 1616;
Thomas E. Starzl, Will Live Organ Donations No Longer Be Justified?,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1985, at 5.
20. "[O]nly three percent of those who serve as organ donors are carrying
a signed donor card at the time they are pronounced dead, .'. . "Developments
in the Law - Medical Technology and the Law, supra note 13, at 1619.
21. Express donation became the "de facto policy" that emerged following
the first organ transplants. See Barnett & Kaserman, supra note 3, at 120.
22. See Barnett & Kaserman, supra note 3, at 121.
23. Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339, 2344-47 (1984) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 273-274e (1988)). The statute provides: "It shall be unlawful for
any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human
organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the
transfer affects interstate commerce." 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1988). Only
"reasonable payments associated with the removal, transportation, implanta-
tion, processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a human organ
or the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages" for a donor are permitted.
42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (1988). Penalties for violating the act include a fine of
no more than $50,000 and/or imprisonment for not than five years. 42 U.S.C.
§ 274e(b) (1988).
Most states also prohibit commercial transactions involving organs. See,
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.1 (Michie 1992).
24. Barnett & Kaserman, supra note 3, at 121 n.16 (noting that organ
procurement officers are an exception to this general prohibition).
1995]
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that psychological barriers such as a reluctance to confront one's
mortality may prevent individuals from considering organ do-
nation. 25 Second, an individual who is ambivalent about donat-
ing his or her organs may be further dissuaded because the
current system allows no monetary compensation. 26 Finally,
physicians or hospital representatives may be unwilling to request
a family's permission to harvest the organs of a recently deceased
individual who has not made a donative gift.27
Although other methods of organ procurement, such as a
system relying on presumed consent, might alleviate the shortage
of cadaveric organs available for transplantations2 improving
25. See Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The
Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1989) (arguing
that consent to orgar donation is the equivalent of assenting to an individual's
"own dismemberment"); Developments in the Law - Medical Technology
and the Law, supra note 16, at 1618 (noting that the barriers are largely the
same as the barriers that make 80076 of people die intestate).
26. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (discussing statutes that
prohibit receiving "valuable consideration" for organs).
27. The reluctance of physicians to confront families to request organ
donation may be due to:
[U]nwarranted fears of legal liability, a legitimate concern that
negative publicity might damage further organ procurement ef-
forts, a desire to respect the family's wishes, an unwillingness to
cause the grieving family any more stress, physicians' reluctance
to ask something of the family when they were unable to save the
patient, and physicians' and nurses' uncertainty about the concept
of brain death or how to identify a potential donor.
Developments in the Law - Medical Technology and the Law, supra note
16, at 1619. See also TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTr AND HumAN Svcs., ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS 35-36 (1986); Jardine, supra note 1, at 1658-59 (noting that "mere
silence" often defeats a donor's intent because of hospitals' fear of liability
and concern for families' well being).
28. Presumed consent is one alternative to express donation. Presumed
consent assumes that, absent an affirmative statement to the contrary, a donor
does not object to post-mortem organ removal. See Barnett & Kaseman, supra
note 3, at 121-23. A review of the literature on organ procurement policy
yields five alternative policies to the current system of express donation. These
include: presumed consent, conscription (or an organ draft), routine request,
compensation, and a market system. A discussion of these alternatives is
beyond the scope of this paper. See generally id. at 119-27 (discussing these
alternative systems). See also Marvin Brains, Transplantable Human Organs:
Should Their Sale Be Authorized by State Statutes?, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 183
(1977) (proposing a combined altruistic and market driven system); Jesse
Dukeminier, Jr., Supplying Organs for Transplantation, 68 MICH. L. REv.
811 (1970) (proposing statutes to avoid market pressure on organ procurement);
Jesse Dukeminier, Jr. & David Sanders, Organ Transplantation: A Proposal
for Routine Salvaging of Cadaver Organs, 279 NEW ENG. J. MED. 413 (1968);
David L. Kaserman & A.H. Barnett, An Economics Analysis of Transplant
Organs: A Comment and Extension, 19 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 57 (1991); L.https://ope cholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/6
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the express donation system remains the most viable method for
increasing the supply of transplant organs. 29 Existing statutes
that govern organ procurement generally follow the UAGA's
system of express or voluntary donation. 0 Even though express
donation is widely accepted, the contours and limits of the
UAGA's express donation system remain unknown. Despite this
uncertainty, legislatures have adhered to the express donation
system." Additionally, few people have challenged express do-
nation laws.32 Thus, changing the current system, rather than
adopting a completely new system, seems most likely to succeed.
C. Legislative Attempts to Increase Organ Supply
Congress enacted the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984
to address the shortage of organs available for transplantation. 33
The National Organ Transplant Act provides guidelines for
organ procurement organizations,3 4 prohibits interstate organ
Roels et al, Effect of a Presumed Consent Law on Organ Retrieval in Belgium,
22 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2078 (1990); Richard Schwindt & Aidan R. Vining,
Proposal for a Future Delivery Market for Transplant Organs, 11 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 483 (1986) (arguing for an organized, public futures market
for organs); Theodore Silver, The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and
a Proposed Model Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U. L. REV. 681 (1988) (proposing
that the state be allowed to conscript cadaveric organs); Aaron Spital, The
Shortage of Organs for Transplantation: Where Do We Go From Here?, 325
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1243 (1991); David E. Chapman, Comment, Retailing
Human Organs Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 J. MARsaALL L.
REV. 393 (1983) (arguing that the UCC would provide adequate controls for
the sale of organs).
29. One commentary suggests that the current system of express donation
has failed in its entirety. See Barnett & Kaserman, supra note 3, at 120-21.
Physicians, however, suggest that the demand for cadaveric organs may
diminish as animal organs are successfully transplanted into humans. Telephone
Interview with Dr. Richard L. Hurwitz, Director, Virginia Vascular Associates
(Jan. 13, 1994).
30. See infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text (discussing federal and
state statutes concerning organ donation).
31. See McIntosh, supra note 1, at 174.
32. See infra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have
challenged the UAGA).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274e (1988). See generally Sipes, supra note 16, at
46 (noting that Congress' intent in enacting the National Organ Transplant
Act was also to "assist in improving the network of donors and recipients
and in raising public awareness").
34. 42 U.S.C. § 274. The act established the Organ Procurement and
Transplant Network to facilitate locating organs for potential recipients. The
Organ Procurement and Transplant Network is a not-for-profit entity that
matches donated organs with compatible recipients according to tissue type,
size of organ, and other factors. The act also requires the Organ Procurement
and Tranisplant Network to publish information concerning organ donation.
1995]
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sales,35 and requires the establishment of a National Task Force
to study the organ shortage. 6 The first report of the National
Task Force recommended that health care professionals take
proactive steps to identify potential organ donors.37 Congress
codified this recommendation in the 1987 amendments to the
Social Security Act.38 Under these amendments, hospitals that
receive Medicare or Medicaid funding must establish written
procedures for informing families of potential donors about the
option of organ donation.3 9 The recommendations of the Na-
tional Task Force also led to the creation of a national organ
sharing system to assist private organ procurement agencies. 40
Because the scope of federal legislation addressing the organ
shortage is limited, state statutes based on the Uniform Ana-
tomical Gift Act (UAGA) provide most of the law governing
organ procurement procedures. 4' Drafted in 1968 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL),42 the UAGA's main purpose was to remove the
Sipes, supra note 16, at 46. See also McIntosh, supra note 1, at 175.
In addition, the act established guidelines for organ procurement organi-
zations which include: requiring not-for-profit status, designating geographical
boundaries, requiring at least fifty potential donors per geographical boundary
each year, and requiring that qualified personnel administer transplant pro-
grams. 42 U.S.C. § 273(b).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 274e. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text
(discussing the prohibition on the sale of organs codified in the National
Transplant Act of 1984).
36. Pub. L. No. 98-507 §§ 101-105. The task force was appointed by the
Health and Human Services Secretary to study the organ shortage problem.
In 1986, the task force filed a final report analyzing the organ shortage and
recommending possible solutions. See TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTA-
TION, supra note 27. See generally Sipes, supra note 16, at 46 (describing the
task force's findings).
37. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 27, at 23.
38. Social Security Act § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8(a)(1)(A) (1988).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8(a)(1)(A). Legislative history suggests that
familial consent is not required if the individual has already designated his or
her intent to make a donative gift. Rather, the familial consent provision is
designed to encourage organ donation in cases where an individual has not
completed a document of gift. Cf. LEGISLATIW HISTORY OF THE BUDGET
RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3607, 3963-65.
40. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 25, at 49. See
supra note 34 (discussing the Organ Procurement and Transplant Network).
See generally Sipes, supra note 16, at 46-47 (explaining that the Network's
purpose is to assist organ procurement groups).
41. McIntosh, supra note 1, at 172-74.
42. The purpose of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) is to promote uniformity of state law. The NCCUSL
drafts models for state law. Members of the NCCUSL, which include repre-
sentatives from all states, then introduce the proposed model to their respectivehttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/6
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barriers to organ donation caused by conflicting and incomplete
state and common laws. 43
The UAGA and the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984
responded to a growing demand for cadaveric organs for trans-
plantation. 44 The speed with which states adopted the 1968
UAGA demonstrates that states needed uniform standards gov-
erning organ procurement. 5 Today, the demand for cadaveric
organs for transplantation continues to outweigh the supply of
available organs.46 In response to the persistent organ shortage,
the NCCUSL amended the UAGA in 1987 to more effectively
increase the supply of cadaveric organs.'7 As amended, the
UAGA may therefore serve as a springboard for states seeking
to increase the supply of cadaveric organs.
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE UAGA AND T=E VAGA
A. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
As the continued organ shortage demonstrates, current legis-
lation has not solved the problems with the organ procurement
system."
1. Documenting Intent to Make an Anatomical Gift
One problem in procuring an adequate number of organs for
transplantation is discerning whether individuals intended to
donate their organs. To foster uniformity in donor designation
procedures, the UAGA establishes procedures for making ana-
tomical gifts. 49 Section 2(b) allows any competent adult 0 to
state legislatures. McIntosh, supra note 1, at 171-72 n.8. See also LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY oF AmwucAN LAW 652 (1985).
43. UNrn. ANATOMaCAL Gr ACT Prefatory Note (1987), 8A U.L.A. 20-22
(1993). Describing the different state laws governing organ donation, the
preface to the 1968 UAGA advocated drafting a model law to address common
legal questions arising from organ donation. The Prefatory Note stated that
due to the recent success of organ transplantation, common law and state
laws were ill-equipped to deal with these legal questions. The Prefatory Note
of the 1987 UAGA restated the goal of promoting greater uniformity among
state laws. According to the Prefatory Note, the 1987 UAGA and NCCUSL
drafted revisions and additions to address the inadequacies in the 1968 system.
44. See supra notes 31 and 44-47 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 6 (noting that by 1972 all fifty states adopted the main
provisions in the 1968 UAGA).
46. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
47. See infra part II.A (discussing the 1987 UAGA).
48. See supra note 43 (discussing revisions to the UAGA).
49. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (discussing the NCCUSL's
purpose in drafting uniform acts).
1995]
Washington University Open Scholarship
194 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 47:185
make an anatomical gift by completing a document of gift."
People can donate their organs by will or by signed statement. 2
The most common form of donative instrument is a statement
imprinted on the back of motor vehicle drivers' licenses, which
remains valid even if the license is later suspended, canceled, or
expires.53 Section 2(h) specifies that only express revocation may
invalidate an anatomical gift, and once the donor dies, the gift
becomes irrevocable.5 4
Uniform donor designation procedures are crucial to the transplant process
because organs remain viable for transplantation for only a short length of
time. A heart, lung, or heart-lung combination can be preserved for only as
long as 4 to 6 hours. A liver can be preserved only for as long as 12 to 24
hours. A kidney can be preserved only for as long 48 to 72 hours. UNITED
NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, FACTS EVERYONE SHOULD KNow ABOUT
ORGAN DONATION AND TRANSPLANTATION (1993).
50. Under the UAGA, a competent adult is "[a]n individual who is at
least 18 years of age." UNn'. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(a) (1987), 8A U.L.A.
33 (1993).
51. Section 2(b) provides:
An anatomical gift may be made only by a document of gift
signed by the donor. If the donor cannot sign, the document of
gift must be signed by another individual and by two witnesses,
all of whom have signed at the direction and in the presence of
the donor and of each other, and state that it has been so signed.
UNIF. ANATOMICAL Gwr ACT § 2(b) (1987), 8A U.L.A. 33 (1993).
In theory, individually executed donative gifts should be the most preferred
method of organ donation because once made, these gifts are irrevocable upon
the donor's death and no additional consent is Tequired from family members
to harvest these organs. Critics note, however, that physicians routinely fail
to harvest organs without obtaining familial consent even when the donor has
completed a valid document of gift. See infra notes 101-103 and accompanying
text (explaining why hospitals also obtain familial consent and suggesting that
liability should accrue to physicians who require unnecessary additional familial
consent). See also Kathleen S. Anderson & Daniel M. Fox, The Impact of
Routine Inquiry Laws on Organ Donation, HEALTH AR., Winter 1988, at 67
("No organ procurement agency will remove organs solely on the approval of
a signed donor card, although its presence may encourage family members to
consent to donation.").
52. UNir. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(b) and (e) (1987), 8A U.L.A. 33-34
(1993).
53. The UAGA provides specifically for imprinting donor documents on
motor vehicle licenses. UmiF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(c) (1987), 8A U.L.A.
34 (1993). Section 2(c) provides: "If a document of gift is attached to or
imprinted on a donor's motor vehicle operator's or chauffeur's license, the
document of gift must comply with subsection (b). Revocation, suspension,
expiration, or cancellation of the license does not invalidate the anatomical
gift." Id. Compare § 2(c) with VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-342G (Michie 1994)
("The donor designation provided pursuant to subsection D may only be
rescinded by appearing in person at a Department branch office. .. ").
54. Section 2(h) provides: "An anatomical gift that is not revoked by the
donor before death is irrevocable and does not require the consent or con-
currence of any person after the donor's death." UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT
ACT § 2(h) (1987), 8A U.L.A. 34 (1993).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/6
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2. Liability Limitations
The UAGA does not rely solely on its document of gift
provision to ascertain donative intent, but also imposes an
affirmative duty on emergency personne 5 5 and hospitals to
determine an individual's donative intent. Section 5(a), for ex-
ample, requires that a hospital ask an individual about his or
her donative intent upon admission to the hospital.5 6 Section
5(c) authorizes emergency personnel and hospitals to perform a
"reasonable search" for a document of gift or other information
indicating donative intent. 7 The UAGA, however, does not
define the scope of this search. 8
The UAGA recommends minimal liability if designated per-
sonnel fail to discover an individual's donative intent. The
comment to section 5 of the UAGA notes that section 5(c) was
added to create "a minimum level of duty towards persons in
55. Emergency personnel include law enforcement officers, firefighters,
paramedics, or other emergency rescuers finding an individual who the searcher
believes is dead or near death. UNir. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 5(c)(1) (1987),
8A U.L.A. 47 (1993).
56. Section 5(a) provides: "[O]n or before admission to a hospital, or as
soon as possible thereafter, a person designated by the hospital [shall] ask
each patient who is at least [18] years of age: 'Are you an organ or tissue
donor?' UNu. ANATOMCAL GIFr ACT § 5(a), 8A ULA 47 (1993).
57. Section 5(c) provides:
The following persons shall make a reasonable search for a doc-
ument of gift or other information identifying the bearer as a
donor or as an individual who has refused to make an anatomical
gift:
(I) a law enforcement officer, fireman, paramedic, or other emer-
gency rescuer finding an individual who the searcher believes is
dead or near death; and
(2) a hospital, upon admission of an individual at or near the
time of death, if there is not immediately available any other
source of that information.
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GI=T ACT § 5(c) (1987), 8A U.L.A. 47 (1993). Compare
§ 5(c) with VA. CODE. ANN. § 32.1-292.1.A, .B (Michie Supp. 1994). See infra
notes 67-83 (discussing VAGA provision).
58. Virginia has interpreted § 5(c) to authorize a physical search of the
victim to determine donative intent. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-292.1.A, .B (Michie
Supp. 1994). Section 5(a) provides: "The following persons may make a
reasonable search for a document of gift or other information identifying the
bearer as a donor or as an individual who has refused to make an anatomical
gift: . . ." VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-292.1.A (Michie Supp. 1994) (emphasis
added).
Section 32.1-292.1.B clarifies subsection A by specifying the nature of the
"reasonable search." Section 32.1-292.1.B provides: "A physical search pur-
suant to subsection A may be conducted at or near the time of death or
hospital admission and shall be limited to those personal effects of the subject
where a driver's license may be reasonably stored.... ." VA. CODE ANN.
§ 32.1-292.1.B (Michie Supp. 1994).
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an unconscious state and toward those who are conscious but
otherwise unable to communicate. ' 59 Section 5(f), which applies
to sections 5(a) and 5(c), shields emergency personnel and hos-
pitals from civil and criminal liability but authorizes "appro-
priate administrative sanctions." 6 The comment to the UAGA
recommends that "hospital accrediting agencies, law enforce-
ment, and other state agencies that have existing disciplinary
procedures" impose sanctions. 61 The UAGA provides no guid-
ance, however, for determining what constitute "appropriate
administrative sanctions.' '62
In addition to the limitation on liability in section 5(f), section
11(c) 63 also limits liability of health care personnel. 4 Under
section 11(c), health care personnel are not held liable for
59. UNIF. ANATOMICAL Gut ACT § 5 cmt. (1987), 8A U.L.A. 48 (1993).
60. Section 5(f) provides: "A person who fails to discharge the duties
imposed by this section is not subject to criminal or civil liability but is subject
to appropriate administrative sanctions." UNn:. ANATOMICAL GIrT ACT § 5(f)
(1987), 8A U.L.A. 47 (1993). The administrative sanctions contained in § 5(f)
also apply to a hospital's failure to make these inquiries.
See infra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia's routine
inquiry and required request provisions). See generally Are Michigan Hospitals
Complying with the Required Request Law?, MicmoAN HOsPITALS, Sept. 1991,
at 21 (reporting survey results determining reasons for sharp decrease in
donations following implementation of the Required Requests law); Thomas
E. Burris et al., Impact of Routine Inquiry Legislation in Oregon on Eye
Donations, 6 CoRNEA 226 (1987) (finding increase of 135% in donor eye
procurements in 1984-85); M.F. Mozes et al., Impediments to Successful Organ
Procurement in the "'Required Request" Era: An Urban Center Experience,
23 TRANSPILAirATION PROc. 2545 (1991); M.K. Norris, Required Request: Why
It Has Not Significantly Improved Donor Shortage, 19 HEART & LUNG 685
(1990) (noting that the anticipated increase in donors was not realized); Robert
M. Veatch, Routine Inquiry About Organ Donation - An Alternative to
Presumed Consent, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1246 (1991) (analyzing presumed
consent and alternatives, including required request); B.A. Virnig & A.L.
Caplan, Required Request: What Difference Has it Made?, 24 TRANsPLAN-
TATION PRoc. 2155 (1992) (concluding that required request laws have greater
indirect impact than direct impact).
61. UNIF. ANATOMIcAL Gir ACT § 5 cmt. (1987), 8A U.L.A. 48-49 (1993).
62. Umi. ANATOMICAL Giwr ACT § 5(f) (1987), 8A U.L.A. 47 (1993).
63. Section 11(c) provides:
A hospital, physician, surgeon, [coroner], [medical examiner],
[local public health officer], enucleator, technician, or other per-
son, who acts in accordance with this [Act] or with the applicable
anatomical gift law of another state [or a foreign country] or
attempts in good faith to do so is not liable for that act in a civil
action or criminal proceeding.
UNIu. ANATOMICAL G=r ACT § 11(c) (1987), 8A U.L.A. 59-60 (1993) (brackets
in original).
64. Health care personnel may include: hospitals, physicians, surgeons,
coroners, medical examiners, local public health officers, enucleators, and
technicians. Id.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/6
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harvesting an individual's organs without ascertaining donative
intent if they act in "good faith." Section 11(c), therefore,
encourages health care providers to take proactive steps to
harvest organs.65 Absent a clear indication that a health care
provider did not act in "good faith," courts generally uphold
this limitation on liability as necessary to promote the UAGA's
goal of increasing the supply of organs available for transplan-
tation."
B. The Virginia Anatomical Gift Code
1. Documenting Intent to Make an Anatomical Gift
The VAGA, Virginia's version of the UAGA, establishes
procedures for donating and harvesting anatomical gifts.67 En-
acted in 1970, the VAGA adopts many of the UAGA's provi-
sions." In an attempt to strengthen the state's voluntary organ
donation system, the Virginia legislature amended the VAGA in
1993.69 The amendments, which exceed the scope of the UAGA,
are intended to enlarge the pool of potential donors and to
increase the supply of available transplant organs.70 The amend-
65. These proactive measures are essential because transplant organs remain
viable for only a limited time. See supra note 49 (discussing the limited
viability of organs).
66. See, e.g., Nicoletta v. Rochester Eye & Human Parts Bank, Inc., 519
N.Y.S.2d 928, 931 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (holding that the "good faith" provision
applied to defendant procurement agency that harvested deceased patient's
eyes after an unauthorized party gave consent); Brown v. Delaware Valley
Transplant Program, 615 A.2d 1379, 1382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding the
"good faith" provision applied to a hospital's participation in harvesting
decedent's heart and kidneys); Hinze v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 1990 WL
121138, at *5 (Tenn. App. Aug. 23, 1990) (holding that the "good faith"
provision applied to the removal of the eyes of plaintiffs decedent after an
unauthorized party gave consent); Williams v. Hofmann, 223 N.W.2d 844,
848 (Wis. 1974) (upholding the UAGA's "good faith" provision as not unduly
vague or unconstitutional). But see Callsen v. Cheltenham York Nursing Home,
624 A.2d 663, 666 (Pa. Commw. 1993) (holding that there was a triable issue
of fact as to whether the "good faith" immunity provision should apply to
efforts to locate a patient's family to consent to organ donation).
67. VA. CODE Ar. §§ 32.1-289 to -297.1 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1994).
68. Although the VAGA contains the basic outline of the UAGA, it does
not follow all UAGA provisions. According to an anonymous source at the
Legislative Services Office, VAGA provision differ from the UAGA in order
to fit UAGA provisions into Virginia's existing statutory framework. Telephone
Interview with Uniform Law Commissioner, Virginia Legislative Services Office
(Jan. 31, 1994). For example, one UAGA provision, Routine Inquiry and
Required Request, U Ni. ANATOMICAL Gwr ACT § 5 (1987), 8A U.L.A. 47
(1993), is not even contained in Virginia's anatomical gifts code section.
Rather, the provision is located, in an amended form, in the hospital licensure
section of the Virginia code. VA. CODE AN. § 32.1-127 (Michie Supp. 1994).
69. Telephone Interview with Kenneth V. Geroe, Vice-Chairman of the
Virginia Democratic Party (Nov. 11, 1993).
70. Id. Amendments to the Virginia Code include: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-
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ments establish procedures to make donor information more
accessible at the time of a donor's death by changing existing
driver's license donor designation procedures. 7'
Prior to the 1993 amendments, the VAGA, like most state
anatomical gift codes, required only that a driver's license
include a uniform donor document.7 2 As amended, section 46.2-
342.D of the Virginia Code requires the Department of Motor
Vehicles (DMV) to establish additional procedures whereby a
driver's license applicant can specify his or her donative intent.73
The VAGA's new provision delegates responsibility for recording
290, -290.1, -292.1, -295, and 46.2-342 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1994). See infra
notes 71-90 and accompanying text (discussing the 1993 amendments).
71. See infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text (discussing the VAGA
amendments). Other amendments to the Virginia Code that attempt to promote
organ procurement efforts include: 1) authorizing a minor under the age of
eighteen to make donative gifts with the written consent of his or her parent
or guardian, VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-290.A (Michie Supp. 1994); and 2)
permitting authorized persons to take "medically necessary steps" to maintain
organ viability for transplantation pending a search for donor authorization
or familial consent, VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-295.E (Michie Supp. 1994).
72. Section 46.2-342.D provides:
The Department [of Motor Vehicles] shall establish a method by
which an applicant for a driver's license or an identification card
may designate his willingness to be an organ donor ... and shall
cooperate with the Virginia Transplant Council to ensure that such
method is designed to encourage organ donation with a minimum
of effort on the part of the donor and the Department.
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-342.D (Michie 1994).
73. Section 46.2-342.D previously provided:
Every license shall also bear the following document which the
licensee may complete.
[UNIFORM DONOR DOCUMENT] OF
Print or type name of donor
In the hope that I may help others, I hereby make this anatomical
gift without cost to my estate, to take effect upon my death. The
words and marks below indicate my desires. I give:
(a) - eyes and any other needed organs or parts
(b) -- only the following organs or parts ...
Specify the organ(s) or part(s) ... for the purposes of trans-
plantation, therapy, medical research, or education;
Limitations or special wishes, if any:
- Signed by the donor and the following two witnesses in
the presence of each other:
Signature of Donor, Date of Birth of Donor
Date Signed, City & State
Witness, Witness
This is a legal document under Article 2 (s. 32.1-289 et seq.)
of Chapter 8 of Title 32.1 or similar laws.
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-342.D (Michie 1988).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/6
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donor designation to the DMV and Virginia Transplant Coun-
cil.74 In addition, the amendment requires the DMV and Virginia
Transplant Council to revise the Uniform Donor Document. 75
Prior to the amendments, the VAGA did nothing to ensure
that physicians or other qualified authorities would discover a
person's anatomical gift even if that person had completed a
valid donor document. 76 Physicians and administrators often
cannot locate donor documents contained on a driver's license
when a potential donor is admitted to the hospital. Therefore,
even searches for donor documentation conducted by hospital
and emergency personnel pursuant to UAGA section 5(c) may
prove fruitless. 77
The VAGA amendments attempt to address the potential
unavailability of donor documents in trauma situations in section
46.2-342.E by authorizing the DMV to designate a donor's status
on his or her driving record .7  To further its objective of
discovering donor status, the Virginia legislature added section
32.1-292.1 .B, which authorizes law enforcement officials to search
a person's driving record to determine his or her donor status
if, upon hospital admission, a physical search reveals no relevant
documents.7 9 Documentation of an anatomical gift in a DMV
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-342.D (Michie 1994). See supra note 72 (quoting
statutory provision).
The Virginia Transplant Council was established "[f]or the purpose of
conducting educational and informational activities and coordinating such
activities as they relate to organ and tissue procurement and transplantation
efforts in the Commonwealth.... ." The Virginia Transplant Council mem-
bership includes representatives from the University of Virginia Medical Center,
the Medical College of Virginia, the Virginia Organ Procurement Agency, the
Eastern Virginia Renal Transplant Program, the Eastern Virginia Tissue Bank,
the Old Dominion Eye Bank, the Lion's Eye and Research Center of Eastern
Virginia, the Eye Bank and Research Foundation. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-
297.1 (Michie 1992).
75. VA. CODE Ar. § 46.2-342.K (Michie 1994).
76. The UAGA requires that an individual indicate donative intent via a
signed organ donor document. UNi. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(b) (1987),
8A U.L.A. 33 (1993). According to some commentators, however, "only three
percent of those who serve as organ donors are carrying a signed donor card
at the time they are pronounced dead." Developments in the Law - Medical
Technology and the Law, supra note 13 at 1619. See also R. Magreiter, What
Can Be Done About the Insufficient Supply of Grafts?, 19 TRANSPLANTATION
PROC. 79, 82 (1987).
77. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (discussing section 5(c)
of the UAGA).
78. Section 46.2-342.E provides: "If an applicant designates his willingness
to be a donor pursuant to subsection D, the Department may make a notation
of this designation or card and shall make a notation of this designation on
his driver record." VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-342.E (Michie 1994).
79. According to a Uniform Law Commissioner, the Virginia legislature
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driving record constitutes sufficient authority to harvest an
organ.80
added § 32.1-293.1.B to address the concern that an unconscious adult would
be unable to signify that he or she had made an anatomical gift. Telephone
Interview with Uniform Law Commissioner, Virginia Office of Legislative
Services (Jan. 31, 1994). Section 32.1-292.1.B provides:
Any law-enforcement officer may conduct an administrative search
of the subject's Department of Motor Vehicles driver record to
determine the person's authorization for organ donation or refusal
of organ donation.... Any information, document, tangible ob-
jects or other items discovered during such search shall be used
solely for the purpose of ascertaining whether the subject intends
to make an anatomical gift, and in no event shall any such
discovered material be admissible in any subsequent criminal or
civil proceeding.
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-292.1.B (Michie 1994).
Only two other states require the Department of Motor Vehicles to designate
donative status on more than the driver's license. Florida requires the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles to note donative status in the driver's record. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.921 (West Supp. 1994) (creating a donor identification
program by providing a method for designating donative status on identifi-
cation cards, driver licenses, and driver records); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.9215
(West Supp. 1994) (creating an educational program relating to anatomical
gifts and assessing the program's effectiveness in procuring organs). New
Mexico requires the Department of Motor Vehicles to microfilm a copy of a
donative gift made pursuant to a driver's license application or renewal and
file it in the statewide organ and tissue donor registry. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-6-5 (Michie 1994). New Mexico also allows state police to verify donor
information on the microfilmed document upon request of an authorized
hospital.
The majority of states, however, require only that the Department of
Motor Vehicles record a driver's donative status on the license. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-42(b) (West 1987) (requiring that the driver's
license provide a conspicuous indication of donative intent to enable immediate
identification of organ donors); HAw. REv. STAT. § 286-109.5 (1992) (requiring
a system for designating donative intent be imprinted on driver's licenses);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:410.B (West Supp. 1994) (requiring the DMV, at
the time of license renewal, to inquire whether an individual would like to
make a donative gift and, if the individual so signifies, requiring the DMV
to make an appropriate designation on the driver's license); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 29, § 540-C (West Supp. 1993) (requiring the Secretary of State to
provide, on each driver's license issued, a statement indicating a declaration
of an anatomical gift); R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-10.3-32(9) (Supp. 1993) (requiring
the DMV to include organ donor information on a driver's license); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 55-50-407(9) (1993) (requiring the DMV to include organ donor
information on a driver's license); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6687b
(West Supp. 1994) (requiring the DMV to include a method for indicating
donative intent on a driver's license, and authorizing an organ or tissue
procurement organization to determine if the deceased is a declared donor);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5241(b) (Supp. 1993) (authorizing law enforcement
official or designated hospital representative to inspect an individual's driver's
license to determine whether that individual has made a donative gift); W.
VA. CODE § 17B-IB-1 (1991) (requiring the DMV to provide a method forhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/6
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2. Liability Limitations
In addition to establishing procedures designed to make it
easier to determine if a person is an organ donor, the VAGA
also provides broader liability limitations than the corresponding
UAGA provisions."1 The VAGA contains the UAGA liability
limitation that shields health care providers from liability for
harvesting organs in "good faith." '8 2 The 1993 amendments to
the VAGA, however, also grant the DMV civil and criminal
immunity for failing to make donor designations in a drivers'
records. 3 There is no such corresponding UAGA provision. 4
determine whether that individual has made a donative gift); Wyo. STAT. § 35-
5-112 (1994) (requiring the DMV to provide a method for donor designation
on driver's licenses).
Some states do not require designation of donative intent at all. See, e.g.,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-10 (West Supp. 1994) (requiring individuals to be
informed of the procedures for making an anatomical gifts); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 157.06(2) & (5)(C) (West 1989 & Supp. 1993) (requiring the DMV to include
a method for designating donative intent on a driver's license and authorizing
hospitals to perform a physical search for this information).
80. Section 46.2-342.F provides: "The donor designation authorized in
subsection E shall be sufficient legal authority for the removal, following
death, of the subject's organs or tissues without additional authority from the
donor, or his family or estate." VA. CODE Ami. § 46.2-342.F (Michie 1994).
See supra note 78 (providing the text of subsection E).
81. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-289 to -297.1 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1994).
The Virginia Code differs with respect to the administrative sanctions described
in the Routine Inquiry and Required Request provision of the UAGA. Al-
though the Virginia Code contains a version of Routine Inquiry and Required
Request, the Code does not impose administrative sanctions for a failure to
request organ donation from a potential donor or his or her family, Rather,
the Code provides for generic sanctions administered by the Virginia Board
of Health only if a hospital fails to establish routine protocols for routine
request. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.0 (Michie 1992). See supra notes 60-62
and accompanying text (discussing the liability sanctions contained in the
Routine Inquiry and Required Request provisions of the UAGA).
82. Section 32.1-295.D provides: "A person who acts in.good faith in
accord with the terms of this article, or under the anatomical gift laws of
another state or a foreign country is not liable for damages in any civil action
or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for his act." VA. CODE
ANN. § 32.1-295.D (Michie Supp. 1994). See supra notes 62-65 and accom-
panying text (discussing Section II(C) of the UAGA).
83. Section 46.2-342.J provides: "In the absence of gross negligence or
willful misconduct, the Department and its employees shall be immune from
any civil or criminal liability in connection with the making of or failure to
make a notation of donor designation on any license or card or in any person's
driver record." VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-342.J (Michie 1994).
84. Under the UAGA, donor designation in the Department of Motor
Vehicles records is not a valid means of making an anatomical gift. See supra
part II.A.1 (discussing the UAGA provisions that specify procedures for
making anatomical gifts).
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III. PROPOSAL FOR CREATING HOSPITAL DUTY AND LABILITY
Increasing the number of organs available for transplantation
under our present organ donor system requires improving access
to donor information.85 Virginia's amendments address some
weaknesses in the express voluntary donation system by author-
izing donor designation in DMV records and authorizing law
enforcement officials to verify donor status.86 This Note, how-
ever, proposes to amend the VAGA in order to more effectively
expand the number of available organs, one of the expressed
purposes of the UAGA.8 7 These changes would improve hospital
access to donor information and would help ensure that all
organs donated via an individually executed document of gift
are harvested.
A. Hospital Access to DMV Records
VAGA section 32.1-292.1.B, which authorizes law enforce-
ment officials to search DMV records for the purpose of veri-
fying donor status,"8 is not likely to significantly increase
anatomical gifts. 8 9 By limiting those authorized to search DMV
records to law enforcement officials, section 292.1.B prevents
the timely and efficient dissemination of donor information.
The Virginia legislature enacted section 292.1 .B to provide donor
information that might otherwise be unavailable at the time of
hospital admission20 In its original form, section 292.1.B au-
thorized both hospitals and law enforcement officials to search
DMV records. 91 As enacted, however, the amendment does not
provide this access to hospitals. 92
85. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (discussing the low
probability that a individual will have a document of gift upon hospital
admission and detailing legislative attempts to solve this problem by requiring
documentation of donative intent on the driver's license).
86. See supra part II.B (discussing the amendments to the VAGA).
87. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of
the UAGA).
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-292.1.B (Michie 1992). See supra note 75 and
accompanying text (discussing section 32.1-292.1.B).
89. Telephone Interview with Dr. Richard L. Hurwitz, M.D., Director,
Virginia Vascular Associates (Jan. 13, 1994).
90. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing the problem
of locating a document of gift at the time of hospital admission).
91. Letter from Kenneth V. Geroe, Vice-Chairman of the Virginia Dem-
ocratic Party to Oscar E. Edwards, M.D., Glenn R. Barnhart, M.D., Robert
A. Fisher, M.D. & Richar l L. Hurwitz, M.D., (Dec. 3, 1992) (on file with
the Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law).
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-292.1.B (Michie 1994). See supra note 79
(quoting the text of section 32.1-292.1.B as enacted).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/6
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Section 292.1 .B must also authorize hospital access to DMV
records because hospital employees can most efficiently locate
donor documentation. Following a donor's death, an organ must
be harvested immediately or the donor must be placed on a life
support system until the organ can be surgically removed. 9
Requiring a search by law enforcement officials wastes valuable
time, time that could be better spent harvesting the organ and
transporting it for transplantation in a needy recipient. Section
292.1.B creates unnecessary procedural barriers because hospi-
tals, not law enforcement officials, are the common denominator
in the organ procurement process.
The Virginia legislature should remove unnecessary impedi-
ments to organ donor identification by amending section 292.1 .B
to read:94
B. Any law enforcement officer or hospital repre-
sentative(s) may conduct an administrative search of
the subject's Department of Motor Vehicles driver
record to determine the person's authorization for
organ donation or refusal of organ donation. The
hospital shall designate the hospital representative(s).
The Department of Motor Vehicles shall register each
appointed representative and shall be required to verify
each representative's authority to search Department
of Motor Vehicles records prior to permitting access
to the records....
The proposed addition of a hospital representative as a party
who may search DMV records enables a hospital to verify donor
status if a law enforcement official is unavailable. Hospitals
may appoint representatives based upon assessments of the
hospital's transplant program and staffing. 9 The proposed
93. In the case of brain death, artificial life support systems can sufficiently
maintain bodily functions pending harvesting an organ. Physicians have suc-
cessfully used profusion therapy to maintain organ viability in the case of
cardiac death. Profusion therapy allows organs to remain viable by lowering
the body temperature, thereby slowing bodily functions, and keeping blood
pumping through the body. Telephone Interview with Dr. Richard L. Hurwitz,
M.D., Director, Virginia Vascular Associates (Jan. 13, 1994).
94. In the proposed amended VAGA sections, italics indicate textual
additions.
95. Hospitals may want to appoint a representative based upon involvement
with transplant procedures or according to the hospital's pre-existing hierarchal
structure. Appointments should be made keeping in mind that the purpose of
designating a representative is to maintain the confidentiality of information
contained in DMV records. Physicians are not authorized as representatives
in the proposal because all transplant procedures are currently performed in
hospitals. Therefore, physicians may always request that an available hospital
representative perform the DMV records search.
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amendment requires DMV registration of the hospital represen-
tative(s) to preserve the confidentiality of information available
in driving records. 6 If adopted, this amendment to section
292.1.B would abolish the current bifurcated system and would
allow hospitals to directly access donor information.
B. Hospital Liability
Currently all parties who act in "good faith" under section
32.1-295.D, are immune from civil and criminal liability. 97 The
purpose of section 295.D is to encourage authorized parties,
including medical personnel, to harvest organs without fear of
legal reprisal. 9 The liability limitation in section 295.D, however,
is contrary to the purpose of organ procurement laws because
it does not promote organ procurement efforts in all situations."
For example, absent the threat of potential liability, hospital
and emergency personnel may fail to conduct a thorough search
for an individual's donor documents.'00 To promote proactive
efforts to procure organs, the immunity in section 295.D must
be limited to those people who actually harvest organs.
One commentator has suggested creating civil liability for
health care providers for failing to procure organs by imposing
liability on those providers who seek additional familial consent
before harvesting organs. 0' This proposal assumes that the
physician already possesses information indicating a donor's
wish to make an anatomical gift. This approach further assumes
that the physician ignores this information and instead seeks
96. See infra note 124 (discussing privacy concerns that access to DMV
information may raise).
97. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (discussing the "good
faith" immunity provisions in the VAGA).
98. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the policy reasons
for encouraging expedited organ harvesting).
99. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of
the UAGA). See also Uir. ANATOMICAL GIrT ACT § 5(f) (1987), 8A U.L.A.
47 (1993), supra notes 58-61 (discussing the administrative sanctions in the
routine inquiry and required provisions of the UAGA).
100. Cf. infra notes 101-103 and accompanying text (discussing an alter-
native approach that fails to consider the importance of a thorough search
for donor documents).
101. Jardine, supra note 1, at 1659. Jardine suggests that if a hospital or
physician rejects a decedent organ donor's gifts "on the basis of failure to
obtain the legally irrelevant 'consent' from next of kin," a cause of action
for negligence against the hospital may accrue. Id. at 1669. Similarly, Jardine
proposes that causes of action for tortious interference or invasion of privacy
against those members of decedent's family who interfered with the transplant
may accrue. Id. at 1686, 1689.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/6
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familial consent."°2 Although this proposal discourages physi-
cians and hospitals from requiring additional familial consent
before harvesting organs, it fails to stress the importance of a
thorough search for donor documents.'03 Under this proposal,
a physician or hospital could conceivably perform a cursory
search for donor status and, after finding no such designation,
request that the family make an anatomical gift.
To ensure a thorough search for documentation of an ana-
tomical gift, hospital personnel must be authorized to access
DMV records, and they must be civilly liable for failing to
conduct a physical as well as a DMV record search to determine
donor status. To provide incentives for determining donor des-
ignation, section 295.D should be amended to include:1 4
D. A person who acts in good faith in accord with
the terms of this article, or under the anatomical gift
laws of another state or a foreign country is not liable
for damages in any civil action or subject to prose-
cution in any criminal proceeding for his act. This
section shall not affect the sanctions contained in
section 292.1. C.
Section 292.1.C should then be added, and include:
C. A hospital that fails to discharge the duties imposed
by Section 292.1(1) and (2) is not subject to criminal
liability but may be subject to civil liability and ap-
propriate administrative sanctions, including, but not
limited to, fines and/or revocation of license.
Section 292.1.D should also be added, and include:
D. Pursuant to guidelines established by the Virginia
State Department of Health and Virginia Transplant
Council, hospitals shall be required to prepare written
quarterly reports. These written quarterly reports shall
include the following:
1) A numeric identifier for all persons who have
died in the hospital during the relevant quarter.
102. Id. at 1658-59.
103. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (discussing potential
causes of action under the proposed amendments to remedy these shortcom-
ings). See also supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing obtaining
familial consent).
104. Creating liability for nonfeasance is not a new concept under the
UAGA. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (explaining the admin-
istrative sanctions contained in section 5(f) of the UAGA).
19951 205
Washington University Open Scholarship
206 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 47:185
2) A designation of each person in Section 292.1. C(a)
medically eligible to make an anatomical gift at the
time of death.
3) A designation of whether donor information was
obtained for each of the persons eligible to make
an anatomical gift through:
a) verbal or written consent by the decedent;
b) a physical search of the decedent;
c) a Department of Motor Vehicle records search
of the decedent;
d) consent of the next of kin pursuant to Section
32.1-290.1.
4) In the case of organs harvested pursuant to
familial consent, whether an attempt to obtain do-
nor information specified in Section 292.1.D(3)(a)-
(c) was conducted by the appropriate personnel.
5) A designation of which organs were harvestedfrom persons consenting to organ donation pursuant
to the methods described in Section 292.1.D(3).
The additions to sections 292.1.C and 292.1.D would require
hospitals to alter organ donor procedures. The proposed addition
of liability for a hospital's failure to verify donor status in
section 292.1 .C would make hospitals accountable to both po-
tential donors and to donees on waiting lists. The proposed
amendment imposes a reporting requirement to determine whether
hospitals have properly verified a patient's donor status. The
reporting requirement in section 292.13.D will ensure that hos-
pitals conduct routine searches for donor information. To avoid
liability under section 292.1.D(4), hospitals will be required to
perform an exhaustive search for an individual's document of
gift, thereby making familial consent a less preferable method
of making a donative gift. 105
IV. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
The proposed amendments to the VAGA would encourage
hospitals to determine individual donor status prior to requesting
donor gifts from families. The proposal eliminates barriers to
obtaining donor information by granting hospitals access to
DMV records.' °6 Furthermore, the proposal provides an incentive
for hospitals to obtain donor information by imposing an affir-
105. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the problems
associated with obtaining familial consent for organ donation).
106. See supra part III.A (discussing proposed amendments to the Virginia
Code granting hospitals access to DMV records).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/6
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mative duty to search for donor status. 0 7 These additions to the
VAGA would enhance organ procurement efforts by expanding
hospitals' responsibility.'0°
Requiring hospitals to perform both a physical search and
DMV records search creates a uniform standard which all hos-
pitals must observe. The proposal imposes mandatory guidelines
that require hospitals to search for donor status in a prescribed
manner.109 Such standards ensure a minimum duty to all indi-
viduals who are unable, at the time of hospital admission, to
indicate or express their desire to make an anatomical gift." 0
Moreover, this requirement comports with UAGA guidelines
that require hospital personnel to establish individual intent prior
to requesting that a family make an anatomical gift."'
A. Reporting Requirement
The proposed reporting requirement would enable interested
parties to monitor hospitals' compliance with the proposed
search guidelines and to track how donative gifts are made. For
each person who dies either upon arrival at, or while in, the
hospital the proposal requires the hospital to document whether
the patient was an eligible donor and whether the hospital
performed the prescribed search for individual donative status
prior to consulting the family." 2 Requiring hospitals to report
such information would allow interested parties to determine
107. See supra part III.B (discussing the proposal for civil liability and
administrative sanctions for a hospital's failure to determine individual don-
ative status).
108. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text (explaining why hospitals,
in addition to law enforcement officials, should have access to donor infor-
mation).
109. See supra part III.A (discussing the proposed search protocols).
110. The proposal requires a search of DMV records because in many
circumstances, individuals are unconscious at the time of admission to a
hospital and are unable to indicate whether they have made a donative gift.
The UAGA's routine inquiry and required request provisions address this
problem. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of
routine inquiry and required request). See also supra notes 56-57 and accom-
panying text (discussing the physical search provisions in the VAGA).
111. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing the UAGA
provision requiring hospitals or physicians to attempt to determine the indi-
vidual's donative intent prior to consulting with the family). But see supra
notes 108-09 and accompanying text (questioning the effectiveness of UAGA
provisions authorizing organ donation solely on the basis of an individually
executed gift).
112. See supra notes 94-105 (discussing the DMV records search provisions
and reporting requirements in the proposed amendments).
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the success of the DMV's new donor designation procedures." 3
In addition, the reporting requirement creates liability for hos-
pitals that fail to determine donor status and would give hos-
pitals an incentive to perform prescribed searches in all necessary
situations. 14
Under the proposal, hospitals that report a failure to ascertain
donative status are subject to penalties enforced by the Virginia
Department of Health or by an interested citizen."' The Virginia
Department of Health, the direct recipient of donor information
reports, for example, could require hospitals to search for donor
status as a condition of hospital licensure." 6 Moreover, the
Virginia Department of Health or any citizen could bring a civil
suit to penalize hospitals for failing to search for donor status.",7
113. One of the goals of the 1993 amendments to the VAGA was to
encourage more individuals to make donative gifts by using the uniform donor
document on the back of their drivers license. See supra notes 74-76 and
accompanying text. Because the DMV, in cooperation with the Virginia
Transplant Council, is responsible for promulgating a new uniform donor
document, the document's success or failure in encouraging individuals to
make donative gift should be monitored. See supra notes 72-75 and accom-
panying text (discussing the creation of a new uniform donor document).
114. See supra part III.B (discussing the proposed amendments creating
civil liability and administrative sanctions for hospitals that fail to search for
donative status).
115. The proposal gives the Virginia Department of Health specific authority
to enforce the search provisions. See supra part III.B (granting enforcement
authority to the Virginia Department of Health). See infra notes 117-18 and
accompanying text (explaining how a citizen could sue a hospital for non-
compliance with the search -provisions).
116. The Virginia code section about hospital licensure provides: "State
agencies shall make or cause to be made only such inspections of hospitals as
are necessary to carry out the various obligations imposed on each agency by
applicable state and federal laws and regulations. . . ." VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-
125.1 (Michie 1992). Because the statute provides for hospital licensure by the
Department of Health, the Department of Health could require hospitals to
comply with the proposed reporting requirement as an "applicable state law"
and as a requisite for licensure. Id.
The Virginia code requires licensure to establish or operate hospitals or
nursing homes. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-125 (Michie 1992). For a detailed
discussion of hospital licensure requirements, see generally ROBERT D. MILLER,
PROBLEMS IN HosprrAL LAw 295-96 (5th ed. 1988); Terri Finkbine Arnold, Let
Technology Counteract Technology: Protecting the Medical Record in the
Computer Age, 15 HAsnNos Comm. & ENT. L.J. 455 (1993).
117. The proposal provides only for civil suits as a judicial remedy. Criminal
actions would be outside the scope of the UAGA and VAGA. Currently, the
UAGA has one provision authorizing administrative sanctions, and the VAGA
does not impose any penalties. See supra notes 60-66, 81-84 and accompanying
text (discussing the administrative sanctions and liability limitations in the
UAGA and the liability limitations in the VAGA, respectively). This proposal
attempts to encourage organ donation by facilitating access to information
without discouraging physicians and hospitals from maintaining organ trans-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/v l47/iss1/6
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The potential for a citizen to bring a private attorney general
action would give hospitals additional encouragement to comply
with the proposal's search provisions and would facilitate the
Virginia Department of Health's enforcement of the reporting
requirement."18
B. 'Administering the Proposals
Although the proposal's search provision and reporting re-
quirements would require hospitals to implement new proce-
dures, the overriding societal benefit of increased organ donation
outweighs this added potential burden." 9 Over 3,000 of the
plant programs due to liability concerns. Criminal actions - an extreme
measure - might be more detrimental to organ procurement efforts than
beneficial.
A private attorney general "is someone who sues 'to vindicate the public
interest' by representing collectively those who individually could not afford
the costs of litigation; . . ." John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney
General: Why the Model of Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42
MD. L. REv. 215, 216 (1983). For a more detailed discussion about private
attorney generals, see generally Bryant Garth, et al., The Institution of the
Private Attorney General: Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class
Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 353 (1988); Carl Cheng, Comment,
Important Rights and the Private Attorney General Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV.
1929 (1985); David Shub, Note, Private Attorneys General, Prevailing Parties,
and Public Benefit: Attorney's Fees Awards for Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 42
DuE L.J. 706 (1992).
Private citizens who wished to bring citizens' suits would also be required
to meet standing requirements which include: 1) the citizens must prove "injury
in fact"; 2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of; and 3) it must be "likely" as opposed to merely
"speculative" that injury will be redressable by a favorable decision. Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). See generally William
A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YAE L.J. 221 (1988); John
Treangen, Note, Standing: Closing the Doors of Judicial Review Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation, 36 S.D. L. REv. 136 (1991); David R. Dow,
Essay, Standing and Rights, 36 EmORY L.J. 1195 (1987).
118. Those people on waiting lists for organs would have the greatest
incentive to monitor hospital compliance with the proposed statutory search
requirements. The proposed requirement that hospitals submit quarterly reports
would facilitate such monitoring. Under the Freedom of Information Act,
individuals would have access to hospital reports. Virginia's Freedom of
Information Act allows any interested party to access "records in the custody
of public officials." VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-340.1 (Michie Supp. 1994). Under
this act, "[a]ny exception and exemption from applicability shall be narrowly
construed in order that no thing which should be public may be hidden from
any person." Id. Because any individual may access reported information, he
or she could determine whether a hospital had followed the statutory require-
ments.
119. Most individuals support organ procurement. See supra note 16 and
accompanying text (discussing Gallup poll findings regarding organ donation).
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4,942 hospitals in the United States are not-for-profit 20 and
exist to improve the health status of their communities.12 1 This
community service mission accords with the purpose of organ
procurement programs.'
Minimal changes in hospital procedures would be necessary
for hospitals to comply with the proposal's reporting require-
ments. Hospitals already have comprehensive record-keeping
abilities that could be easily modified to accommodate the
proposal's reporting requirements. In addition to creating med-
ical records for each patient, hospitals must typically prepare
reports for quality review boards. Because the UAGA requires
hospitals to inquire about donative status, reporting the requisite
information about each patient and generating quarterly reports
would entail procedural rather than substantive alterations in
organ procurement policies.'2
C. Confidentiality
Maintaining a patient's confidentiality may be the most for-
midable concern caused by allowing hospital access to DMV
records. 2 4 The proposal allows persons other than law enforce-
ment officials to access DMV records.12 In addition to donor
information, DMV records contain personal information and
120. There are 3,042 nongovernment not-for-profit hospitals in the United
States. 590 hospitals are investor owned (for profit), and 1,310 hospitals are
run by the state or local government. AmEmcAN HOsPITAL ASSOCIATION,
HosPrrAL STATISTICS Table 12A, at 206 (1993).
121. Interview with Dr. Wayne Lerner, Chief Executive Officer, Jewish
Hospital, in St. Louis, Mo. (Jan. 12, 1994).
122. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing the NCCUSL's
purpose in drafting the UAGA).
123. Under the UAGA, for example, hospitals are already required to
perform physical searches and consult with family members about organ
donation. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing the search
requirements). Under the proposed reporting requirement, hospitals assume
only the added responsibility of recording these results. See supra part III.B.
Moreover, in order to receive medicare funding, the Social Security Act requires
hospitals to have organ procurement protocols. See supra notes 38-39 and
accompanying text (discussing the requirements under the Social Security Act).
124. According to a Uniform Law Commissioner for Virginia, hospitals
may not access DMV records because there is a countervailing interest in
maintaining patient confidentiality. The commissioner noted that one reason
that the Virginia legislature excluded hospital personnel from the list of persons
authorized under VAGA to conduct a DMV records search is that there is
the potential for abuse. Telkphone Interview with Uniform Law Commissioner,
Virginia Office of Legislative Services (Jan. 31, 1994).
125. See supra part III.A (discussing hospital access to DMV records under
the proposed amendment).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/6
LIABILITY UNDER ORGAN DONATION LAWS
list driving infractions. 26 The proposed amendment, therefore,
grants hospital personnel access to information that a hospital
would not normally acquire about a patient. 27 Access by hospital
personnel to a donor's driving record, however, poses a mini-
mum threat of abuse because the proposal limits the number of
persons who may access DMV records. 2 Moreover, a search
for donor information occurs only if the patient is near death
and a physical search fails to produce evidence of donor status. 129
These limitations would ensure that hospital access to DMV
records occurs only under controlled, narrow circumstances. 30
Because hospitals must preserve patient confidentiality,13 ' any
private information obtained through a DMV records search
should not be used for nonmedical purposes. 32 Patient confi-
dentiality protects any information that is not a matter of public
record.133 Thus, a patient could sue for invasion of privacy and
126. Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, CIV.A. No. 85-3449, 1993 WL
496590, *I (Mass. Super. June 8, 1993) (noting that DMV records contain
information about motor vehicle infractions in addition to personal informa-
tion).
127. Upon admission, hospitals require information about health insurance,
medical background, cases, and personal data. BARRY R. FuRow ET AL.,
HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 308 (1991).
128. See supra part III.A (discussing persons are who authorized to access
DMV records under the proposed amendments).
129. See supra part III.A (describing search procedures under the proposals).
130. Because the proposal limits the circumstances when a search for donor
information may be conducted, hospital representatives could not arbitrarily
search DMV records for information about any person. Furthermore, the
proposal requires the DMV to utilize security measures to ensure that only
hospital representatives access information to determine donative status in
emergency situations. See proposed amendment to section 292.1.B, supra part
III.A.
131. The Virginia code protects the confidentiality of patient records. See
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-116:2 (Michie 1992) (requiring state Health Commis-
sioner and all other persons to whom data is submitted to maintain the
confidentiality of patient information); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5307 (Michie
1992) (requiring private review agents maintain the confidentiality of medical
records).
132. Courts have categorized a person's age and height as private infor-
mation with respect to a DMV record because they "can be readily associated
with a particular individual." Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, No. CIV.A.
85-3449, 1993 WL 496590, at *5 (Mass. Super June 8, 1993). The court also
categorized other items of information, including organ donor information,
license, number, name, address, gender, class of license, restrictions on license
and the date of expiration, as public information. Id. at *3.
133. In Geisberger v. Willuhn, 390 N.E.2d 945, 946 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979),
for example, a patient sued his physician for breach of confidential relation-
ship, breach of contract, and invasion of privacy after the physician disclosed
the patient's name to law enforcement officers. The court held that disclosing
a patient's name did not violate patient confidentiality because names are
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breach of a confidential relationship if a health professional
discloses private patient information. 3 4 Patient confidentiality
would, therefore, prevent a hospital representative who accessed
DMV records from disclosing any private information.'35
CONCLUSION
The proposed amendments to the VAGA would ensure that
more individual donative gifts are honored. The current express
donation system provides inadequate safeguards for hospitals to
determine individual donative intent. Not only must hospitals
have access to donor information in the most efficient manner,
but hospitals must also verify donative intent. Imposing an
affirmative duty on hospitals to determine individual donor
status, or face potential liability, would achieve these objectives.
Moreover, the benefit from increasing the number of donated
organs outweighs the minimal loss of patient confidentiality and
added responsibility of the reporting requirement. States that
adopt the VAGA provisions as amended by these proposals
would take an affirmative step toward alleviating the shortage
of organs for transplantation.
Christine E. Edwards*
public information. Id. at 948. The court categorized private information as
that information relating to a person's private life that, if made public, would
"be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities."
Id.
Critics note, however, that many parties may access donor information.
These critics contend that patients do not have a great privacy interest in
patient records. See generally Terri Finkbine Arnold, Let Technology Coun-
teract Technology: Protecting the Medical Record in the Computer Age, 15
HAsTiNGs COMM. & ENT. L.J. 455 (1993).
134. See, e.g., Geisberger, 390 N.E.2d 945, 945 (discussing plaintiff's claims
of breach of confidential relationship, breach of contract and invasion of
privacy); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 696 P.2d 527 (Or.
1985) (en banc) (discussing plaintiff's claims of breach of privacy and invasion
of confidence).
135. Although a professional may not disclose confidential patient infor-
mation, this does not guarantee that confidentiality will extend to other parties
who have access to patient information. A variety of parties routinely access
patient's medical information. For many of these parties, consent to access
medical records is presumed. FuRtow ET AL., supra note 127, at 309. See also
Bernard R. Adams, Medical Research and Personal Privacy, 30 VnL. L. REv.
1077 (1985) (examining the right to privacy for information contained in
medical records).
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